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There is growing public awareness of the ethical issues raised by progress in 
many areas of neuroscience. This commentary reviews the issues, which are 
triaged in terms of their novelty and their imminence, with an exploration of 
the relevant ethical principles in each case. 
In less than a year, "neuroethics" has joined the vocabulary of most neuroscientists. 
Exactly what the word signifies may not be clear to most of us, however. Both the word 
and the field to which it refers come largely from individuals outside neuroscience. 
Newspaper columnist William Safire gave the field its name, and defining statements of 
the issues are found in such sources as Brain Policy1 by bioethicist Robert Blank, Our 
Posthuman Future2 by historian Francis Fukuyama and a cover story in The Economist 
magazine (May 23, 2002). Neuroscientists themselves have been relatively scarce in 
public discourse on neuroethics, perhaps because many of the issues under discussion 
seem far-fetched. Need we devote serious attention now to the needs and rights of 
cyborg humans with computer-augmented brains? Probably not, given the current state 
of technology. Yet neuroscientists are just the people to guide the discussion toward 
issues of current and near-term priority. How does neuroethics, as presented to us in 
the literature, relate to the current state of neuroscience and its foreseeable future? 
Here I attempt to triage the issues that have been raised, separating those that are 
both new and immediate from those that are not new or are likely to arise only in the 
distant future. Although all three categories deserve our continued attention, the first 
poses the most immediate intellectual and social challenges. 
Three broad issues survive the triage for novelty and imminence: enhancement of 
normal function, court-ordered CNS intervention and 'brain-reading'. Each emerges from 
work in multiple areas of neuroscience, from molecular to cognitive neuroscience. The 
nature of the ethical issues raised are similarly varied, and include the rights to equal 
opportunity, privacy and freedom. 
Enhancement of normal function 
If drugs and other forms of central nervous system intervention can be used to improve 
the mood, cognition or behavior of people with problems in these areas, what might 
they do for normal individuals? Some treatments can be viewed as 'normalizers', which 
have little or no effect on systems that are already normal (for instance, the mood 
stablizer lithium3) and will not therefore figure in debates over enhancement. Other 
treatments can indeed make normal people 'better than normal'. Pharmacological 
enhancement is arguably being practiced now in several psychological domains: 
enhancement of mood, cognition and vegetative functions, including sleep, appetite and 
sex. 
The enhancement potential of some psychiatric treatments is, in itself, nothing new. 
Until recently, however, psychotropic medications had significant risks and side effects 
that made them attractive only as an alternative to illness. With our growing 
understanding of neurotransmission at a molecular level, it has been possible to design 
more selective drugs with better side-effect profiles. In addition, adjuvant therapy with 
other drugs is increasingly used to counteract the remaining side effects. For example, 
the most troublesome side effect for users of selective seratonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) is sexual dysfunction, which responds well to the drug sildenafil (Viagra). Other 
drugs specifically developed to counteract the sexual side effects of SSRIs are in 
development and clinical trials (Vernalis press release, May 22, 2002). The result of 
both new designer drugs and adjuvant drugs is the same: increasingly selective 
neurochemical alteration of our mental states and abilities. 
Peter Kramer's book Listening to Prozac4 first focused society's attention on the 
possibility of safe mood enhancement. The growth in sales of SSRIs clearly indicates 
that more people, with less severe depression, are using them. Has the threshold for 
SSRI use dropped below the line separating the healthy from the sick? This question is 
hard to answer for several reasons. First, the line between healthy and sick is a fuzzy 
and perhaps arbitrary one. There is no simple discontinuity between the characteristic 
mood of patients with diagnosable mood disorders and the range of moods found in the 
general population5. Second, diagnostic thresholds are clearly moving downward as a 
result of these very changes in treatment. For a given severity of illness, the better 
tolerated the treatment, the more likely patients are to present for diagnosis and the 
more likely physicians are to diagnose and treat. As a related point, other more common 
and less debilitating conditions are also being treated with SSRIs, such as cyclic changes 
in women's moods before menstruation6. Third, although depression is usually a 
remitting-relapsing disease with typically years between episodes, patients today are 
likely to be treated prophylactically with antidepressant medication for periods of 1D3
years, even when symptom free7. Thus there are many people now on antidepressant 
medication who are healthy, with only a vulnerability to depression as opposed to 
depression. These changes in psychiatric practice have resulted in many people using 
SSRIs and other antidepressants who would not have been prescribed these drugs ten 
years ago. There is no reason to predict their ranks will not continue to swell, and to 
include healthier and higher-functioning people. 
What changes might healthy individuals hope to experience through the use of 
antidepressant medication? Mood enhancement belongs on the docket of new and 
imminent bioethical issues in neuroscience only if current and foreseeable medications 
can deliver pleasing results to healthy people. A handful of studies have assessed the 
effects of SSRIs on mood and personality in normal subjects over short periods of a few 
months or less (for example, refs. 8, 9). The effects are relatively selective, reducing 
self-reported negative affect (such as fear, hostility) while leaving positive affect 
(happiness, excitement) the same. The drugs also increase affiliative behavior in 
laboratory social interactions and cooperative/competitive games played with 
confederates, for example decreasing the number of spoken commands and increasing 
the number of suggestions. In one double-blind crossover design, subjects not only 
were more cooperative in a game, but showed real-world changes in behavior as well: 
roommates found them less submissive on citalopam, though no more dominant or 
hostile9. Much more research is needed to clarify the effects of SSRIs and other 
antidepressant agents on mood and behavior of normal subjects, but the evidence so far 
suggests subtle salutary effects. 
Pharmacological manipulations of other neurotransmitter systems can alter cognitive 
abilities, including attention and memory. Attention, in the sense of sustained effort and 
resistance to distraction, is primarily modulated by dopamine and norepinephrine. 
Stimulant medication, such methylphenidate (Ritalin) and amphetamines (Adderol) 
affect both systems and are effective in treating attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). In normal individuals, these drugs induce reliable changes in vigilance, 
response time and higher cognitive functions, such as novel problem-solving and 
planning10. As it turns out, thousands of normal, healthy children and adults have 
discovered similar effects on their own. 
The question of whether and when to treat ADHD medically is a complex and 
contentious one for many reasons, most of which are not related to enhancement. 
However, as with affective disorders, it is difficult to locate a discontinuity between 
normal attentional functioning and ADHD (NIH consensus statement, 1998). To the 
extent that we intervene too 'high up' the continuum, we are practicing enhancement. 
According to most experts, pharmacological enhancement of children's attention is 
routine in some communities11. Parents who are eager to give their children every edge 
in school may press their pediatricians for medication, and teachers often welcome the 
greater orderliness in a classroom of attentive children. Because ADHD in children is 
diagnosed primarily on the basis of parent and teacher questionnaire responses, it can 
be difficult to free the diagnostic process from the values and standards of the 
respondents. 
Whereas diagnostic 'over-reach' is a reason that some arguably normal children receive 
stimulants, many young adults with no pretense at all to a diagnosis are using 
stimulants to enhance their performance in college. Methylphenidate is considered by 
some to be the most widely used recreational drug on American campuses12. Students 
have often approached me after talks on the topic to relate their own stories about 
Ritalin use among their non-ADHD peers, for example recalling a hockey coach who 
always reminded her team to take their Ritalin before playing another school. 
Loss of cholinergic neurons is responsible for many of the cognitive changes in 
Alzheimer's disease, including the pronounced impairment of memory. Drug therapies 
such as donepezil (Aricept) that increase acetylcholine can slow or reverse the loss of 
memory ability in the early stages of the disease. Can this or other treatments improve 
the memory of healthy individuals? Discussions of memory enhancement must take age 
into account. Although certain specialized pursuits could conceivably benefit from super-
memory, the forgetting rates of normal young humans seem to be optimal for most 
purposes13. Empirically, prodigious memory is linked to difficulties with thinking and 
problem solving14, and computationally, boosting the durability of individual memories 
decreases the ability to generalize15. Memory enhancement is of more interest in middle 
age and beyond, when the normal process of memory loss is first noticeable in healthy 
individuals16. Rejuvenation of memory function in healthy older people is a form of 
memory enhancement with broad appeal. Indeed, memory-enhancing nutritional 
supplements are a billion-dollar industry (Nutrition Business Journal, 1998), despite 
little evidence concerning efficacy. Ginkgo biloba, the most popular of the memory-
enhancing supplements, was recently found to be equivalent to placebo17.
How close are we to more specific and effective memory enhancement for healthy older 
adults? Many drug companies are now directing enormous research efforts to the 
development of memory-boosting drugs (Neuroinvestment, September 2001). The 
candidate drugs target various stages in the molecular cascade that underlies memory 
formation, including presynaptic neurotransmitter release (for example, existing 
cholinesterase inhibitors such as donezipil) and postsynaptic effects (such as the class of 
drugs known as ampakines). These drugs are currently considered treatments for 
dementia and so-called 'mild cognitive impairment', which is more severe than normal 
age-related cognitive decline. No drug companies have yet targeted normal memory for 
enhancement, but there is reason to believe that some of the products under 
development would work for that purpose as well. For example, treatment of healthy 
human subjects with an ampakine improved performance on several memory tests18.
Advances in the neurochemistry of sleep, appetite and sex are paving the way for better 
pharmacological control of these functions as well, with results that will be of interest to 
normal people. The drug modafinil (Provigil), approved for the treatment of narcolepsy, 
can prolong alert wakefulness for days19. Its use by healthy people is currently being 
explored by the military20. The appeal of such a drug to average people who would like 
more time in their lives is obvious, and media coverage of modafinil has been extensive. 
Weight control is a societal preoccupation, and Wallace Simpson's quip that "a woman 
cannot be too rich or too thin" sums up the likely attitude of most people to a safe, 
long-term appetite suppressant. There is currently a very limited choice of medication 
for weight loss, and what is available is less effective than the Fenfluramine-
Phenylpropanolanine combination, withdrawn from the market in 1997 due to severe 
adverse effects21. However, findings that hormones such as leptin, ghrelin and 
melanocortin are involved in appetite control have given pharmaceutical researchers 
new avenues to explore for drug development. Men without erectile dysfunction have 
discovered sildenafil (Viagra) and created a new market for the drug as an enhancer of 
sexual performance. Although a prescription medication, sildenafil is easily obtained for 
such purposes after completing a short diagnostic questionnaire on the internet22.
Pharmaceutical companies are pursuing drugs that more selectively target the neural 
bases of sexual function, which would have fewer cardiovascular side effects than 
sildenafil. 
In sum, enhancement is not just a theoretical possibility. Enhancement of mood, 
cognition and vegetative functions in healthy people is now a fact of life, and the only 
uncertainties concern the speed with which new and more appealing enhancement 
methods will become available and attract more users. 
Ethical issues in enhancement 
Most of us would love to go through life cheerful and svelte, focusing like a laser beam 
at work and enjoying rapturous sex each night. Yet most of us also feel uneasy about 
the idea of achieving these things through drugs. With the necessary technology at or 
near hand, it is important to examine the reasons for this unease (for a more detailed 
discussion of enhancement in other domains, see ref. 23). Objections to enhancement 
can be divided into two broad categories: problems for the individual user and problems 
for society if use becomes widespread. 
The first problem that springs to mind for many people is the possibility of serious side 
effects for the individual, including long-term or delayed effects that might evade 
current FDA safeguards. Perhaps a youth spent scaling the heights of academic and job 
success thanks to enhancement by Ritalin will be followed by a middle age of premature 
memory loss and cognitive decline. By and large, a concern with long-term or hidden 
side effects is not unique to enhancement but applies to therapeutic treatments as well. 
Its special salience in the case of enhancement may reflect an underlying wariness of 
'free lunches'. There is one respect in which enhancement might deserve extra scrutiny 
for hidden costs, which is suggested by evolutionary considerations. We understand 
little about the design constraints that were being satisfied in the process of creating a 
modern human brain. Therefore we do not know which 'limitations' are there for a good 
reason. As already mentioned, normal forgetting rates seem to be optimal for 
information retrieval. 
A concern unique to enhancement is the moral objection to, in effect, gain without pain. 
Most people in our society feel there is value to earning one's happiness, success, and 
so on. When wealthy parents make their teenage children take summer jobs to earn 
their spending money, they are applying this principle in a way that most of us would 
find reasonable. However, our judgments often deviate from this principle. Although we 
recognize the value of earning life's rewards, our lives are full of shortcuts to looking 
and feeling better. We do not disapprove of people who dislike vegetables improving 
their health by taking vitamin pills. Nor do we begrudge college applicants their SAT 
prep books or Stanley Kaplan classes. Psychopharmacological enhancement can 
therefore be seen as fitting in with an array of practices that are already accepted and 
widespread. 
One variant of the 'no pain, no gain' objection is specific to our emotional lives. Many 
people hold the belief that one cannot experience the beauty and joy of life unless one is 
also acquainted with life's pain. In the words of Nietzsche, "If you take away my devils, 
you will take away my angels too." As an empirical claim, supporting evidence is so far 
lacking. Anecdotal reports of generalized emotional blunting notwithstanding, the small 
literature on short-term SSRI effects in normal subjects suggests no change in either 
direction on positive affect, only a selective decrease in negative affect. In any case, 
even if emotional blunting were a side effect of current mood enhancers, it is not a basis 
for rejecting mood enhancement in general. There is no a-priori reason that newer 
medications would have the same effect. 
Other objections stem from potential harm to society. One worry is that enhancement 
will not be fairly distributed. It is likely that the wealthy and privileged will have the 
choice of self-enhancement and the less privileged will not. Is this what lies at the root 
of our unease with enhancement? Probably not, given that our society is already full of 
such inequities. No one would seek to prohibit private schools, personal trainers or 
cosmetic surgery on the grounds that they are inequitably distributed. Besides, consider 
a scenario in which the entire populace is given full and equal access to Ritalin, Prozac 
and other enhancers. If our qualms about enhancement were linked to equal 
opportunity, then this should set our minds at ease, but more than likely it does not. 
Another social problem with enhancement is that widespread enhancement will raise our 
standards of normalcy. This in turn will put individuals who choose not to enhance at a 
disadvantage, in effect a form of indirect coercion. Even the enhancement of mood, 
which at first glance lacks a competitive function, seems to be associated with increased 
social ability8, which does confer an advantage in many walks of life. Such coercion may 
already be felt by parents whose children attend schools with high rates of Ritalin use. 
Clearly coercion is not a good thing. Yet it would seem at least as much of an 
infringement on personal freedom to restrict access to safe enhancements for the sake 
of avoiding the indirect coercion of individuals who do not wish to partake. 
The idea of self-enhancement through manipulations of brain function feels wrong or 
dangerous to many people. Yet the root cause of that feeling is difficult to find. Perhaps 
it is a misleading feeling, which we will get over once we have discussed the issue of 
enhancement thoroughly and rationally. Or perhaps further discussion will reveal the 
cause of our reflexive worry. 
Court-ordered CNS intervention 
Another controversial use of our current psychopharmacopia is to improve the behavior 
of others when that behavior is medically unremarkable but socially undesirable. 
Rehabilitation has long been intertwined with punishment in our criminal justice system. 
Successful rehabilitation benefits both the offender and society, insofar as it reduces 
repeat offenses. It may be offered as an option or as a mandatory component of a 
sentence. Furthermore, court-ordered therapy or rehabilitation is not confined to 
medically diagnosed illnesses. Judges may require healthy individuals to undergo such 
interventions as parenting classes or anger management therapy. 
Addiction, aggression, impulse control and even parenting behavior have been studied 
for several decades, and we are increasingly able to manipulate the relevant neural 
systems in animals by drugs and other interventions. Some of this work has been 
successfully generalized to humans. For example, impulsive violence has been linked to 
seratonergic abnormalities in patient24, criminal25 and healthy community populations26.
Accordingly, SSRIs have been tried as a treatment for aggressive behavior, and found to 
be helpful27. For example, in three double-blind studies, fluoxetine (compared against 
placebo) reduced aggression in patients with personality disorder25, 28, 29.
How close do our current practices come to directly altering brain function under the 
rubric of court-ordered rehabilitation? For any person deemed a threat to self or others, 
including criminal offenders, judges routinely order compliance with medication. 
Although the ethical issues raised by involuntary treatment are far from trivial, there is 
nevertheless broad consensus in favor of applying recognized treatments in such cases. 
A more controversial use is sentencing sexual offenders to pharmacological treatments 
aimed at reducing their sex drive. Several states in the US have enacted laws that 
either allow or require sex offenders to take the synthetic hormone medroxy-
progesterone acetate, which lowers serum testosterone and significantly decreases 
recidivism30. Other pharmacological approaches involving seratonin are being explored 
in research studies30.
The issue of diagnostic creep is also relevant here. Many behavioral tendencies that the 
layman would consider 'bad' but not medical illnesses have acquired diagnostic codes in 
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association31. These 
diagnoses include drug abuse, compulsive shoplifting and sexual attraction to children. 
Psychiatrist Alvin Poussaint has even suggested that racism is a psychiatric illness and 
should be treated by therapy (The New York Times, August 26, 1999). The 'medical 
model' of condemnable behavior has been criticized when used to excuse, not simply 
explain, behavior32. In the future, the model's impact may be less friendly to offenders, 
by subjecting more of them to involuntary regimens of psychotropic medication. 
Court-ordered CNS intervention has not been highlighted in recent discussions of 
neuroethics, but deserves greater attention for three reasons. First, some of the 
relevant technologies are already available, for example SSRIs to reduce violent 
behavior. Second, the practice of requiring nonpharmacological treatment aimed at 
changing the behavior of healthy offenders is well established. And if this, in itself, does 
not put us on the slippery slope toward court-ordered CNS modification of healthy 
offenders, then the third fact surely does, namely the use of antiadrogen treatment with 
convicted sex offenders. 
Ethics of court-ordered intervention 
Court-ordered CNS intervention need not simply subjugate an individual's interests to 
those of society, in the style of Soviet psychiatry or A Clockwork Orange. Such uses do 
not challenge our moral intuitions or social policies; they are clear violations of an 
individual's freedom and human dignity. The harder questions arise when we consider 
uses of neuroscience in the criminal justice system for genuinely therapeutic purposes. 
For example, a judge's order to attend anger management class or a parenting support 
group is intended to help the offender, in addition to whatever society gains from having 
fewer hotheads and abusive parents among us. Substituting medications that improve 
anger management or parenting skills renders the effect no less therapeutic. Yet many 
people's intuitions raise a flag here. And if not here, then at the thought of more 
permanent interventions such as implanted stimulators or neurosurgery to achieve the 
same goals. 
What moral intuition triggers this flag? Primarily an intuition about individual freedom, 
of a kind that we have not previously denied even to prisoners: the freedom to think 
one's own thoughts and have one's own personality. In anger management class, a 
person is free to think, "This is stupid. No way am I going to use these methods." In 
contrast, the mechanism by which Prozac curbs impulsive violence cannot be accepted 
or resisted in the same way. Offering CNS interventions in the context of a choice, with 
conventional therapies and incarceration as alternatives, mitigates this worry but does 
not eliminate it. Sentencing alternatives are rarely appealing options, introducing 
implicit coercion. 
'Brain reading' 
Mind reading is the stuff of science fiction, and the current capabilities of neuroscience 
fall far short of such a feat. Even a major leap in the signal-to-noise ratio of functional 
brain imaging would simply leave us with gigabytes of more accurate physiological data 
whose psychological meaning would be obscure. Nevertheless, the accomplishments of 
the field to date include neural correlates of many psychological traits and states. 
Furthermore, the demand for 'scientific' measures of personality, veracity, attitudes and 
behavioral dispositions in our society ensures that, ready or not, these measures will 
have an increasing role in our lives. 
Most of our knowledge of individual variation in mental and neural function comes from 
biological psychiatry and concerns patterns of brain activity in mental disorders. This 
work has important future clinical implications, especially in a field in which the major 
diagnostic categories remain syndromal, that is, defined in terms of clusters of signs and 
symptoms. The current state of the art in functional neuroimaging does not earn it a 
place in psychiatric diagnosis. In general, abnormalities that characterize particular 
illnesses can be demonstrated when small groups of patients are compared to control 
subjects, but are not diagnostic at the individual patient level. Nevertheless, diagnostic 
imaging is currently the goal of many research groups, with encouraging results for 
some disorders, such as ADHD33.
Although current imaging methods cannot reliably place most patients in a diagnostic 
category, this limitation does not rule out occasional revelations about an individual. 
Even though most patients' scans will be impossible to classify with certainty, other 
individual scans will deviate enough from the normal pattern to constitute a 'positive' 
finding. One such example comes from studies of drug craving. Drug-free cocaine 
addicts experience a craving state when shown pictures of drug paraphernalia, which 
results in reliable group differences in PET activation of the amygdala, anterior cingulate 
and orbitofrontal cortex34. Although some of the individual scans in the patient group 
are indistinguishable from normal, others clearly differ from normal. In one laboratory, 
at least half of recently detoxified cocaine users could be identified by differential 
amygdala response to drug-related versus non-drug-related pictures (A.R. Childress, 
personal communication). Drug use is not unique in this respect; other stimuli to which 
individuals are strongly attracted evoke activity in similar circuits. For instance, subjects 
aroused by sexually explicit videos activate many of the same limbic system areas35.
Furthermore, the conscious attempt to suppress arousal may also engender a distinct 
pattern of brain activation36, suggesting an advantage of such scans over more 
peripheral measures capable of revealing sexual preferences. 
The significance of such results for individuals is not in their use for classification or 
diagnosis, because of the ambiguity of most people's scans, but in the information they 
reveal about some fraction of the subjects (the size of which varies from study to study) 
whose scans fall clearly outside the normal range. Although subject cooperation is 
required for such scans, because of the need to remain still and focus on the visually 
presented stimuli, the subject need not know the scan's purpose. 
Many recent studies have sought neuroimaging correlates of the dimensions of 
personality found in classic theories of normal personality, such as extraversion and 
neuroticism (see ref. 37 for a review of the social and ethical issues). These studies use 
small groups of subjects, but at least a small fraction of the subjects can be classified by 
visual inspection of the scans (T. Canli, personal communication). Other socially relevant 
characteristics such as racial group identity and unconscious racial attitudes also have 
neural correlates that can be measured in small groups of subjects. For example, a 
study in which four black and four white subjects viewed photographs of black and white 
faces found significant differences in response to ingroup and outgroup faces38. A
correlational study of unconscious attitudes found that white subjects with more 
negative evaluations of black faces had more of an increase in amygdala activity to 
pictures of unfamiliar black than white faces39.
One of the most sought-after uses of 'brain reading' is the detection of deception. In the 
wake of the 9-11 tragedy, there is renewed interest in lie detection for security 
purposes, to screen individuals for their attitudes and allegiances, as well as for 
traditional forensic purposes. The company Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories is already 
marketing a system that uses scalp-recorded ERPs to detect so-called 'guilty 
knowledge', such as familiarity with certain people, objects or scenes. Research seeking 
more neuroanatomically specific measures of deception using fMRI is underway40.
Ethical issues in brain reading 
One problem posed by these developments concerns privacy. As with any testing 
method that reveals information about an individual (such as genetic testing for breast 
cancer risk), it may not always be in the person's best interest to have that information 
available to others. However, there is an added dimension of ethical significance when 
the information concerns the kinds of personal traits and states that neuroimaging may 
reveal. The goal, in some cases already partially realized, involves breaching the privacy 
of a person's own mind. 
Another, more immediate problem concerns the way that brain scans are interpreted 
outside the neuroimaging community. Physiological measures, especially brain-based 
measures, possess an illusory accuracy and objectivity as perceived by the general 
public. One commentator, in proposing the use of Brain Fingerprinting as a screening 
tool at airports, wrote "Although people lie...brainwaves do not" 
(http://www.skirsh.com). Brain-based measures do, in principle, have an advantage as 
indices of psychological traits and states. Measures of brain function are one causal step 
closer to these traits and states than the behavioral or even peripheral autonomic signs 
that form the basis of more familiar measures, from responses on personality 
questionnaires to polygraph tracings. Imaging may therefore, one day, provide the most 
sensitive and specific measures available of psychological processes. For now, however, 
this is not the case, and there is a risk that juries, judges, parole boards, the 
immigration service and so on will weight such measures too heavily in their decision-
making. 
Long-standing issues in neuroethics 
The emerging field of neuroethics is concerned with a broad array of issues beyond the 
three just discussed. Some are familiar, though by no means settled. Others remain 
hypothetical, pending future developments in neuroscience, but are fairly certain to 
materialize within many readers' lifetimes. In both cases, bioethicists, policy makers and 
society in general will benefit from having the perspective of informed neuroscientists 
included in their discussions. 
The familiar issues can themselves be divided into those that relate to neuroscience and 
to other biomedical sciences as well, and those uniquely related to our growing 
understanding of brain function. Common biomedical issues are exemplified by 
questions such as the following. How safe are the new methods of neuroscience, such as 
transcranial magnetic stimulation or high-field MRI, and who should decide? What is the 
appropriate course of action when an incidental neurological abnormality is found in the 
course of research data collection? What considerations should guide the development 
of therapies for diseases such as Parkinson's based on fetal tissue or embryonic stem 
cells? How should promising new therapies be rationed? When and why should 
predictive testing be offered for future neurological or neuropsychiatric illness when no 
cure is available, as with Alzheimer's and Huntington's diseases? These are difficult 
questions, on which reasonable people can disagree. They are also questions with a 
history in bioethics, which offers helpful general principles and precedents. 
Other ethical issues arise exclusively in neuroscience because of the particular subject 
matter of the field. The brain is the organ of the mind, consciousness and selfhood. 
Although the issues in this category are not new, they are evolving as the field evolves 
and in some cases developing new wrinkles. 
The definition of death is one such issue. Until the 1960s, the generally accepted 
criterion for death was permanent cessation of respiration and circulation. The Harvard 
criteria for death, published in 1968, shifted the focus to brain function. This definition 
was refined by a presidential commission in 1981, which defined brain death as "the 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem." This 
definition has, in turn, been found wanting41. With our growing understanding of 
mindDbrain relationships, and our ability to assess them with functional neuroimaging, a 
narrower focus on the status of higher brain functions seems indicated1, 42. However, 
any such move will raise profound questions about personhood and the brain. 
Informed consent for research participation or for treatment43 is another issue that is 
special in neuroscience, because in many cases the subjects or patients in question have 
brain disorders that affect their decision-making ability. The ethics of psychosurgery is a 
related issue, not least because thousands of patients ostensibly consented to the 
destructive and unproven method of prefrontal leucotomy44.
Although relatively rare today, psychosurgery continues to be practiced as a last resort 
for patients suffering from refractory depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
and anxiety disorders. The most common procedures are cingulotomy, stereotactic 
subcaudate tractotomy, anterior capsulotomy and limbic leucotomy, all of which disrupt 
the interconnecting pathways of the limbic system and the prefrontal cortex45, 46.
According to one recent review, at least one third of depressed patients experience 
improvement as a result of these operations, with just under one third of OCD and 
anxiety patients improving45. This could be considered a favorable record with patients 
who have failed to benefit from multiple other treatments. Should we therefore approve 
of psychosurgery as a less-than-last resort? 
Our notions of responsibility and blame, which guide our legal as well as personal ethics, 
seem at odds with deterministic views of human behavior. Whether we are moved by 
the 'Twinkie defense' (the apocryphal defense of a murderer based on his loss of control 
caused by junk-food consumption) or the 'abuse excuse' depends on how we reconcile 
common-sense notions of free will with mechanistic views of the causation of behavior. 
Although the perceived conflict between free will and determinism does not hinge on the 
particulars of any specific deterministic account, progress in cognitive and behavioral 
neuroscience certainly increases the salience of the deterministic view. The abstraction 
that all human behavior is explainable in terms of the laws of physics does not encroach 
much on our intuitions about a defendant's responsibility for his actions. In contrast, a 
detailed account of the mechanisms linking childhood abuse to diminished impulse 
control seems much more likely to temper our intuitions about responsibility and blame. 
As the neuroscience of intentional behavior continues to develop, it will challenge our 
ways of thinking about responsibility and blame. 
Neuroethical questions on the horizon 
The future will bring new ways of enhancing, controlling and 'reading' the brain. The 
current ability of TMS to improve cognition and mood47 by the activation or inhibition of 
specific brain areas may be refined in the service of enhancement or control. In the 
more distant future, similar extensions of deep brain stimulation techniques can be 
envisioned, and genetic manipulations of targeted neural systems and neurosurgery 
could permanently modify brain function. Nanotechnology and neural prostheses might 
eventually create a breed of enhanced human cyborgs. Such possibilities may sound like 
science fiction in 2002, but consider that space travel and test tube babies were once 
just science fiction and seemed every bit as far-fetched in the decades before they 
became reality. 
In addition to altering brain function, our ability to monitor and interpret it could one 
day achieve equally fantastic results. After all, twenty years ago it would have seemed 
implausible that neuroscientists would have even candidate brain indices of truth versus 
lie40, veridical versus false memory48, the likelihood of future violent crime49, styles of 
moral reasoning50, the intention to cooperate51, and even the specific content of 
thoughts (visualizing houses versus faces)52. What might we have in another twenty 
years, or fifty? Our track record for predicting the rate of scientific progress has not 
been impressive. Gene therapy has yet to achieve the promise that seemed imminent 
ten or fifteen years ago, whereas the cloning of mammals took the world by surprise. 
One need not project very far into the future to see the increasing role of neuroscience 
in our lives, and the social and ethical concerns it will bring. Like the field of genetics, 
neuroscience concerns the biological foundations of who we are, of our 'essence'. The 
relationship of self to brain is, if anything, more direct than that of self to genome, and 
neural interventions are more easily accomplished than genetic interventions. Yet 
compared to molecular geneticists, who instigated public discussion in the early days of 
recombinant DNA research, neuroscientists have paid relatively little attention to the 
social implications of their field. The time is now ripe for examination of these 
implications, among scientists themselves and in dialog with policy makers and the 
public. 
Top
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